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THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF DELAYED
APPOINTMENTS AND DISCRETIONARY GRANTS OF
CAPITAL POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL

Celestine Richards McConville*
Indigent capital inmates in Alabama who wish to pursue state postconviction
1
remedies will receive court-appointed counsel only if a court, in its discretion,
'2
determines "that counsel is necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner.
To satisfy this standard, one would think that Alabama courts would make the
appointment determination, as well as the appointment, well before the postconviction
petition must be filed so that counsel could actually assist the capital inmate with
investigating, discovering, and properly raising all known and knowable claims. Indeed,
for precisely these reasons, capital inmates seeking federal habeas relief may invoke their
mandatory statutory right to counsel before filing their petitions. 3 Unfortunately,
Alabama does not follow this practice, and instead delays the appointment determination
until after the capital inmate has filed a capital habeas petition 4 and survived summary
dismissal5-two very difficult tasks, to say the least. Even a disinterested observer
would appreciate the potential problems posed by Alabama's system, especially for
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A. 1988, Boston University; J.D. 1991,
Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Scott W. Howe and Lyn Entzeroth for their helpful comments
on a prior draft and to Nicole Morgan for excellent research assistance. Special thanks to Tom McConville for
his patience and support. As always, any errors are my own.
1. Only four death states provide a discretionary statutory right to capital postconviction counsel.
Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel:
ConstitutionalImplications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 31, 64 n. 189 (listing
Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, and Nebraska). Thirty-two death states provide a mandatory statutory right to
capital postconviction counsel. Id.at 64 n. 188. This figure includes New York, even though the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that the statute violated the state constitution because it contained a coercive deadlock
instruction. State v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 128 (2004). Two death states provide no statutory right to counsel.
McConville, supra, at 65 n. 190. There is no constitutional right to counsel during state postconviction
proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano,492 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1989) (plurality ); Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56
(1987).
2. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.7(c); see also Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a) (Lexis Supp. 2005).
3. McFarlandv. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855-56 (1994) ("An attorney's assistance prior to the filing of a
capital defendant's habeas corpus petition is crucial, because '[t]he complexity of our jurisprudence in this
area ...makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief
without the assistance of persons learned in the law."' (quoting Giarratano,492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy &
O'Connor, JJ., concumng)).
4. According to the Alabama Supreme Court, "most [postconviction] petitioners file their petitions without
the assistance of legal counsel." Exparte Jenkins, 2005 WL 796809 at *5 (Ala. Apr. 8, 2005).
5. Id. (describing the process for appointment of capital postconviction counsel); see also Ala. R. Crim.
Proc. 32.7(c) (listing absence of summary dismissal as a condition precedent to the discretionary grant of
postconviction counsel).
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capital inmates seeking to prove their innocence.
7
6
In Barbour v. Haley, a group of capital inmates filed a section 1983 class action
in federal district court challenging Alabama's delayed appointment system for
postconviction counsel. They argued, among other things, that the system of delayed
appointment violated their due process right of meaningful access to the courts. 8 As
petitioners explained:
Alabama postconviction procedure... is marked by strict pleading requirements, inflexible
filing deadlines, elaborate preclusion doctrines, and other technical pitfalls that cannot
practicably be navigated without competent counsel. The Alabama Attorney General's
Office routinely files motion to dismiss claims in petitions filed pro se by death-row
prisoners on procedural grounds.... Alabama judges have adopted the Attorney General's
interpretation of the pleading requirements of Rule 32, under which petitioners must set out
specific factual details that cannot be obtained unaided from Death Row. Lacking the
ability to interview witnesses, gather records, or investigate factual questions before
filing-let alone the legal skill to understand what form of allegations will make a pleading
9
"sufficiently specific".., prisoners are at risk of summary dismissal.

In other words, without counsel to assist them, capital inmates in Alabama face an
uphill battle in preparing state postconviction petitions capable of withstanding the
government's efforts at summary dismissal. Petitioners also argued that, without state
10
postconviction counsel, petitioners face "the peril of losing federal habeas review"
because the one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal petitions is tolled only
upon the proper filing of a state postconviction petition.ll So the longer a petitioner
waits before filing a state petition, the less time she will have (if any) to investigate,
12
prepare, and file a federal petition.
The federal magistrate judge13 rejected the inmates' access claim, emphasizing not

6. 410 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (M.D. Ala. 2006). The inmates were represented by lawyers from the Equal
Justice Initiative of Alabama (EJI) and the law firm of Holland & Knight. Id.at 1121.
7. Id. at 1124-25. The court certified a class of all
[P]ersons (1) who have been, are or will be in state custody, (2) who are under a sentence of death,
(3) who are unable to afford counsel and have been, are or will be unrepresented by counsel in
connection with the investigation, initiation or prosecution of state postconviction remedies, (4)
whose convictions have become final under state law, (5) who have not completed the
postconviction, collateral review process provided under the laws of Alabama, and (6) for whom the
State refuses to provide counsel for the investigation, initiation and prosecution of state
postconviction remedies.
Id. at 1125.
Submission of
8 Id at 1122-23; Barbour, Pl.'s
Br. in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. for S.J. & Pl.'s
Additional R. 56(e) Materials 26-37 (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter BarbourBr.].
9. Barbour,410 F. Supp. 2d at 1123 (footnote omitted) (quoting BarbourBr. 30-31).
10. Barbour Br. 6; see id.at 5-6, 20, 41.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2000). A state postconviction petition is "'properly filed' when its delivery
and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings." Artuz v. Bennett, 531
U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (emphasis omitted). Thus, a late filing in state court will not toll the federal limitations period.
12. Barbour Br. 6, 20, 41. In their brief opposing summary judgment, the plaintiffs revealed that "[t]wentyone death-row prisoners have less than a week remaining before their federal limitations period expires[, and]
[t]en of these prisoners have less than two days remaining to get to federal court." Id. at 41 (citation omitted).
13. The parties consented to jurisdiction by the federal magistrate judge, as permitted by federal law and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Order, Barbourv. Haley, Civ. Action No. 01-D-1530-N (M.D. Ala. Apr.
3, 2002).
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only the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to interpret the right of access to
postconviction courts as including the right to counsel, 14 but also the Court's admonition
that the right to meaningful access "'guarantees no particular methodology but rather the
conferral of a capability-the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts."' 15 Even without counsel,
plaintiffs were able to file petitions and thus "present" 16 their claims to the courts, so
they were not denied meaningful access. This is true, the court noted, even though "in
some instances collateral review of some of their claims has been denied on procedural
' 17
or limitations grounds."
While the magistrate judge's reasoning is not unassailable, 18 the ultimate ruling is
arguably correct under existing Supreme Court precedent, which has expressed
increasing hostility toward access claims-especially access claims that seek to impose
affirmative obligations on the government. 19 To be sure, the plaintiffs employed a welldesigned strategy: they focused narrowly on the unique circumstances present in
Alabama, arguing that their situation necessitated the appointment of counsel before,
rather than after, filing the petition so that counsel could assist in the investigation,
preparation, and filing of the petition. Such assistance, they argued, was necessary to
obtain review of their claims on the merits.
They were not arguing for the tools
necessary to win their cases but, rather, for assistance in simply putting the claims before
the postconviction court for examination. 2 1 As they explained, it was becoming more
and more difficult for capital inmates in Alabama to obtain representation. 22 Their
arguments wisely attempted to exploit a potential weak spot in the precedent--a spot
created by Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Murray v. Giarratano,23 which emphasized
the complexity of postconviction proceedings and suggested that postconviction counsel
might be constitutionally required if inmates are unable to obtain counsel. 24 But still, the
14. Barbour,410 F. Supp. 2d at 1133-34.
15. Id. at 1133 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996)).
16. Id. at 1132 (emphasis added) ("If the right of access is properly understood as a reasonably adequate
opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights which may not be hindered, then
the plaintiffs' right of access has not been denied because their claims have been presented." (citation and
footnote omitted)).
17. Id.
18. The magistrate judge, for example, was surely wrong to reject out of hand the mere possibility that
dismissals for failure to comply with the limitations period might be caused by government conduct and thus
constitute a denial of meaningful access. As explained later in the discussion, the Supreme Court has indicated
that a dismissal caused by the inadequacy of the government's program can state a claim for denial of access.
See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing Lewis).
19. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 405-06 (2002) (holding that, in order to state a claim for
denial of access, plaintiffs must "identify an underlying cause of action" that has been, or will be, lost as a
result of government conduct and show that there is no other remedy available for the loss); Lewis, 518 U.S. at
351-55 (rejecting claim that access right required access to law libraries or ability to "discover grievances" or
"litigate effectively" (emphasis deleted)); Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10-12 (holding that state is not
constitutionally obligated to supply counsel to capital inmates during postconviction proceedings); Finley, 481
U.S. at 555-57 (holding that state is not constitutionally obligated to supply counsel during postconviction
proceedings).
20. Barbour Br. 27-33.
21. Id. at 37-42.
22. Barbour, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1131; Barbour Br. 33-37, 46-49.
23. 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring); BarbourBr. 15-16.
24. In Giarratano,Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, providing the fifth vote for the majority.
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plaintiffs' argument faced an extreme uphill battle. And given existing precedent, the
ruling could not have been a total surprise.
So, one might ask, why even look twice at the decision? The answer is simple: we
should look twice because, in a jurisdiction that voluntarily grants a statutory right to
capitalpostconviction counsel, the constitutional inquiry should not stop at (or perhaps
even focus on) meaningful access. Instead, it should proceed to the more relevant
inquiry of the meaningful right to capital postconviction counsel. Alabama has decided
to provide capital postconviction counsel as a matter of statutory grace, and, as I have
argued elsewhere, this decision triggers a constitutional obligation to ensure that the right
to counsel is meaningful. 25 Thus, the real question in Barbour is not whether plaintiffs
were denied meaningful access to state postconviction remedies but, rather, whether
Alabama has failed to provide a constitutionally meaningful statutory right to capital
postconviction counsel. This question is an extremely important one for as explained in
detail below, the meaningful counsel claim calls not only for a different analysis but also
for a different conclusion. For the 191 inmates on Alabama's death row 26-- the seventh
largest death-row population among death-penalty states 27--a different conclusion could
make all the difference in the world.
I have spent several years exploring the scope and substance of what I have called
the "meaningfulness requirement"28--a doctrine based in the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution and triggered by the government's voluntary grant of rights designed to
ensure the reliability of the criminal process. 2 9 My exploration of the meaningfulness
requirement has focused particularly on the meaningful right to capital postconviction
counsel-a right that comes into being once the government grants capital inmates a
statutory right to such counsel. 30 A few Supreme Court opinions, 3 ' together with the
refusal of Congress to make ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel a violation
of federal law cognizable on federal habeas, 32 piqued my interest in the subject of
meaningful grants of counsel and ignited a desire to investigate the theoretical
underpinnings of voluntary grants of counsel. Until now, my efforts have centered

492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring). Although he declined to address the question whether
counsel is constitutionally required in capital postconviction proceedings, he noted the importance of counsel in
assisting capital inmates through the maze of postconviction relief. Id. In his view, "meaningful access can be
satisfied in various ways," and, because "no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain
[he could not conclude] that [Virginia's] scheme violates the
counsel . . . in postconviction proceedings ....
Constitution." Id. at 14-15. Justice Kennedy's concurrence appears to leave open the possibility that counsel
might indeed be required to achieve meaningful access.
25. McConville, supra n. 1, at 67-84.
26. Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty 2, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
FactSheet.pdf (Sept. 1, 2006).
27. Id.
28. See Celestine Richards McConville, Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of Capital
Postconviction Counsel: The Scope of the Constitutional Obligation to Monitor Counsel Performance, 66 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 521 (2005); McConville, supra n. 1.
29. McConville, supra n. 1, at 69.
30. E.g. id. at 80-84.
31. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Giarratano,492 U.S. 1; Finley, 481 U.S. 551; Wainwright
v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
32. Federal law prohibits federal habeas petitioners from challenging the effectiveness of statutorily granted
counsel in federal habeas proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(i), 2261(e) (2000).
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largely on two things: proving that the government's decision to provide capital
postconviction counsel creates a concomitant constitutional obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel, and defining effectiveness as requiring not only rigorous
competency standards but also thorough monitoring of counsel's performance during the
actual capital postconviction process. 33 With the Barbourcase comes the opportunity to
continue fleshing out the concept of meaningful capital postconviction counsel,
exploring how discretionary and delayed grants of counsel fare under the glare of the
34
meaningfulness requirement.
Part I of this article explores the relationship between two strands of the
meaningfulness requirement-the right to meaningful access to postconviction remedies
and the right to meaningful postconviction counsel-and explains why these two strands
provide differing levels of protection for the capital inmate and why the meaningful
counsel strand is a better vehicle for challenging Alabama's system of appointing capital
postconviction counsel. As explained in that part, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the meaningful access strand, at least in the postconviction context, was intended to be
very narrow, ensuring virtually nothing more than a reasonable opportunity to bring
relevant claims before the proper postconviction tribunal. The meaningful capital
postconviction counsel strand, on the other hand, is somewhat broader, focusing on the
quality of counsel's performance and, hence, the quality and content of the petition filed
on behalf of the capital inmate.
Part II evaluates the meaningfulness of Alabama's right to counsel, focusing
particularly on the impact of both delayed and discretionary appointments of counsel.
As that part explains, delaying appointment until after the petition has been filed
effectively deprives counsel of any meaningful opportunity to represent her client.
Discretionary appointments are similarly problematic because there is too great a risk
that the postconviction court will be unable to accurately ascertain the need for an
attorney on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, Part II concludes that Alabama's system
fails to adequately protect the rights of capital inmates and thus does not provide a
meaningful right to capital postconviction counsel.
The problems with Alabama's postconviction counsel system have very real, and
very dramatic, consequences. Without meaningful assistance of counsel during the
35
postconviction process, the risk of executing an innocent person rises dramatically.
The risk becomes even greater in light of the tremendous growth of Alabama's death row
population: the number of inmates on Alabama's death row has doubled over the last

33. McConville, supra n. 28, at 543-98 (explaining scope and structure of monitoring requirement);
McConville, supra n. 1, at 80-110 (discussing right to effective assistance and necessity of competency
standards and monitoring).
34. The arguments developed in this article could apply to delayed and discretionary grants of
postconviction counsel in both capital and non-capital cases. Issues of innocence exist in both types of cases,
and navigating the postconviction process is difficult for all petitioners, regardless of the punishment imposed.
Nevertheless, because of the unique and irrevocable nature of the punishment, this article focuses solely on the
constitutional implications of delayed and discretionary grants of capital postconviction counsel.
35. See Barbour Br. 32-33 (explaining that "[d]eath row prisoners who have succeeded in challenging their
convictions and death sentences have all been assisted by counsel who spent hundreds of hours pursuing claims
and avenues of relief that uncovered illegally obtained convictions and death sentences"); id. at 48 (describing
critical role of volunteer counsel in protecting rights).
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decade, and, "[i]n the past few years, Alabama sentenced more people to death per capita
than any other state in the country." 36 The Barbour plaintiffs made great progress in
terms of publicizing the problems with Alabama's system of appointment. The
American Bar Association (ABA) also helped in this endeavor with its recent
recommendation for a moratorium on executions in Alabama, 37 which was based in part
on the inadequacy of Alabama's system of postconviction counsel. 38 Now is the time
for Alabama to listen to the chorus of voices clamoring for meaningful change.

I.

THE MEANINGFULNESS REQUIREMENT IN THE POSTCONVICTION CONTEXT

A close examination of the Supreme Court's due process decisions reveals the
existence of what I have called the "meaningfulness requirement"-a requirement that is
triggered when the government voluntarily grants a right that "is designed to protect
either the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial or the individual rights of criminal
defendants." 39 A meaningful right is not a "futile gesture' 40 but rather is "adequate and
effective' 4 1 and "designed to achieve its purpose.' 4 2 The meaningfulness requirement
surfaced as early as 1941, 4 3 and it has since been applied in the context of direct
review, 44 discretionary review, 4 5 postconviction proceedings, 4 6 and civil rights
47
actions.

36. Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Representation of Death Row Prisoners, http://www.eji.org/
representation.html (accessed Sept. 13, 2006); see also Barbour Br. 12 ("[A]s the death-row population
continues to balloon, substantial numbers of inmates will inevitably be executed who have been unable to
obtain any real judicial consideration of potentially meritorious constitutional challenges to their executions.").
37. Death Penalty Information Center, ABA Assessment Report Calls for Alabama Death Penalty
Moratorium, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/newsanddev.php?scid=68 (accessed Sept. 13, 2006).
38. ABA, Evaluating Fairnessand Accuracy in State Death Penalty Systems: The Alabama Death Penalty
Assessment Report 111 (2006) (recommending that counsel be appointed "at every stage of the legal
proceedings" and that "[c]ounsel should be appointed as quickly as possible prior to any proceedings").
39. McConville, supran. 1, at 69.
40. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985); see Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
41. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393 (quoting Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
42. McConville, supra n. 1, at 69.
43. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (invalidating state prison regulation that interfered with
"petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus").
44. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-58 (state must provide counsel to indigent defendants on appeal as of right);
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18-20 (state must provide free transcript to indigent defendants on appeal as of right or
"find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants").
45. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-16 (1974) (counsel not required for discretionary appeals on direct
review).
46. E.g. Finley, 481 U.S. at 558-59 (state postconviction context); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827
(1977) (postconviction and civil rights contexts); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80 (1974) (same);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485-87 (1969) (federal habeas context). States are not required to provide
postconviction review, Finley, 481 U.S. at 557, so the meaningfulness requirement naturally applies once the
states decide to do so. The relevance of the meaningfulness doctrine to federal habeas relief is not as obvious
because the federal habeas remedy arguably is mandatory. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporatingthe Suspension
Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas for State Prisoners? 92 Mich. L. Rev. 862, 875
(1993) (arguing that Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807), interpreted the Constitution to require federal habeas
remedy). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has applied the meaningfulness doctrine in the federal habeas
context, see Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485-87, and this article proceeds on the assumption that it does so correctly.
See McConville, supra n. 1, at 78-79 n. 267 (discussing implication of applying Bounds' meaningful access
requirement in context of federal habeas review).
47. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 827 (postconviction and civil rights actions); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579-80 (same), see
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The demands of the meaningfulness requirement are not static; they differ
depending on the nature of the voluntarily granted right and the context in which that
right is asserted. Naturally, then, the procedures required to achieve meaningfulness will
not be the same for every right. In general, the more important the right is (in the
Court's view) to the reliability of the criminal process, the more rigorous the procedures
will have to be to protect that right. The Court views direct appeal as of right as more
48
important to the reliability of the criminal process than discretionary review, and it
49
Thus, the meaningfulness
views postconviction review as less important than both.
less demanding in the
and
context
appeal
requirement is fairly demanding in the direct 50
contexts.
postconviction
and
appeal
discretionary
In addition to the purpose of the right and its contribution to the reliability of the
criminal process, the Court also considers the government's sovereign interests in its
criminal justice system. In the postconviction context, the government's sovereignty
interests feature prominently, with the Court being careful to weigh the government's
interests in retaining control over its criminal justice system against the capital inmate's
interest in enjoying the voluntarily granted right. 5 1 If a procedure is too costly, threatens
undue delay in imposition of the sentence, or undermines an important policy choice,
then it will not be part of the meaningfulness requirement. 52 Moreover, while the
meaningfulness requirement sometimes dictates a particular procedure the government
has
must follow, 5 3 it does not always do so, and in these circumstances the government
right. 54
some latitude in selecting procedures designed to ensure a meaningful
In the postconviction context, there are two basic strands of the meaningfulness
requirement: meaningful access to the courts 55 (to pursue postconviction remedies) and
meaningful capital postconviction counsel. The discussion below examines both strands,
explaining why the access strand, as developed and understood by the Supreme Court, is
unhelpful, if not inapplicable, when the relief sought relates to the availability and
performance of counsel. It then explains why the meaningful capital postconviction
counsel strand is a better vehicle for challenging Alabama's system for appointing

also McConville, supra n. 1, at 77-78 (discussing contexts in which meaningfulness requirement applied).
48. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 615 (explaining that discretionary review is not concerned with "whether there
has been a correct adjudication of guilt.., but rather whether the subject matter of the appeal has significant
public interest" (internal quotation marks omitted, citation omitted)); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (stating that direct
appeal is "an integral part of the ...system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant");
McConville, supra n. 1,at 70-75 (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions in Griffin, Douglas, Evitts, Ross,
and Finley).
49. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57 (explaining that postconviction review "is not part of the criminal
proceeding itself' and is "even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review");
McConville, supra n. 1, at 74-75 (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions in Ross and Finley).
50. McConville, supra n. 28, at 531-33; McConville, supra n. 1,at 70-80.
51. Id. at 70.
52. Id.at 75-78 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Finley and Bounds).
53. E.g. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-58 (requiring appointment of counsel for indigent inmates pursuing
direct appeal as of right).
54. McConville, supra n. 1,at 70.
55. The Supreme Court has characterized the source of "the constitutional right of access to courts" as
"unsettled," noting that it has alternately described the right as rooted in due process, equal protection, First
Amendment, and privileges and immunities. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 n. 12. But whatever the source, the
doctrine exists, entitling inmates to meaningful access to the courts.
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capital postconviction counsel.
A.

Right to Meaningful Access to Postconviction Courts

The Supreme Court's meaningful access cases have uniformly been concerned
with preserving what the Court has called "a litigating opportunity, ' 5 6 which, in the
postconviction context, means the opportunity to bring "nonfrivolous" 57 postconviction
challenges to the courts. 58 From the time the access doctrine surfaced, it has focused
rather narrowly on prohibiting the government from imposing obstacles that directly
impede access to the courts, rather than on imposing on the government potentially
onerous affirmative obligations designed to improve access to the courts. 59 Thus, for
example, the Court invalidated a prison regulation requiring inmates to have their
petitions approved by prison officials, 60 as well as a prison regulation forbidding inmates
from assisting one another in preparing legal documents. 6 1 In both situations, the prison
regulation presented a direct obstacle in the path of inmates seeking to bring their
constitutional claims before the courts and accordingly constituted a denial of
62
meaningful access.
Sometimes, however, meaningful access to the courts requires more than removal
of obstacles-it requires affirmative steps designed to ensure "'a reasonably adequate
opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional ights to the
courts.'"63 As a general matter, this occurs when the lack of resources available in the

56. Id.at 414.
57. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 (footnote omitted).
58. Id.
at 355.
59. Id.at 350, 354.
60. Hull, 312 U.S. 546. In Hull, the petitioner attempted to file an original habeas petition with the
Supreme Court, only to have the petition intercepted by prison officials and returned. Id.at 547-48. Officials
also intercepted a letter the petitioner wrote to the Court and forwarded it to a "legal investigator for the state
parole board." Id. at 547 (footnote omitted). After reviewing the letter, the legal investigator responded to the
petitioner, explaining that his "application in its present form would not be acceptable to th[e] court." Id.at
547 n. 1. All of these actions were taken pursuant to a prison regulation that required prisoners to submit "[a]ll
legal documents, briefs, petitions, motions, habeas corpus proceedings and appeals" first to the "institutional
welfare office" and, if approved by that office, to the "legal investigator to the Parole Board." Id. at 548.
Ultimately, the petitioner was able to smuggle a petition to his father, who filed it in the Supreme Court for
him. Hull, 312 U.S. at 548. Upon review, the Supreme Court explained that although the government had
sound reasons for the regulation, "the state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." Id, at 549. The Court's opinion also reflected a concern that the
prison regulation interfered with, and perhaps usurped, federal court authority: "[w]hether a petition for writ of
habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions
for that court alone to determine." Id.
61. Johnson, 393 U.S. 483. In Johnson, a Tennessee prison regulation prohibited inmates from assisting
one another in the preparation of "[w]rits or other legal matters." Id.at 484. The Court invalidated the
regulation, reasoning that it was no different than "a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners
[from] fil[ing] habeas corpus petitions[]"-a rule "that Tennessee could not constitutionally adopt." Id.at 487.
Because Tennessee did not provide "any other source of assistance for [illiterate] prisoners," id., the regulation
served as a direct obstacle in the paths of illiterate inmates seeking access to the courts and thus was
unconstitutional. So Tennessee had a choice. It could enforce its prohibition on inmate assistance and
establish another method of assistance for illiterate inmates in preparing their petitions, or it could simply lift
its prohibition. Id. at 488-90. Notably, Tennessee would acquire an affirmative obligation to assist illiterate
prisoners only if it insisted on shutting off the existing means of accessing the courts. Johnson, 393 U.S. at
489-90.
62. Id.at 487; Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.
63. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825).
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prison "hinder[s]" a petitioner's ability to prepare and properly file a petition. 64 There
are no hard-and-fast rules regarding what steps a state must take to facilitate access;
instead, the states are given ample latitude in selecting a program or policy that allows
reasonable access to the courts. 65 Some states might choose to provide law libraries,
while others might choose to provide access to some method of legal assistance. 66 As
long as postconviction petitioners are able to prepare and properly file a petition, the
meaningful access obligation is satisfied.6 7 Conversely, if a petitioner is unable to
prepare and properly file a postconviction petition and that inability is caused by the
government-either because the government interfered with the preparation or filing or
because the government's assistance program was insufficient--then meaningful access
is violated.6 8
For a time, it appeared the access right might also require the government to
undertake affirmative efforts to optimize the petitioner's ability to prepare and file a
postconviction petition. 69 This was the result of the Court's decision in Bounds v.

64. Id. (holding "inmate ... must . . .demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim"); see also Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971) (summarily affirming the district court's judgment requiring state prison to provide either a better array
of legal materials or some other form of legal assistance to inmates); Johnson, 393 U.S. at 490 (holding that if
the state insists on prohibiting inmates from assisting one another in preparing postconviction petitions, then
the state must provide "some reasonable alternative to assist [illiterate] inmates in the preparation of petitions
for post-conviction relief').
65. E.g. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-51, 356-57 (emphasizing that government may select method of providing
meaningful access); Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830 (explaining "that while adequate law libraries are one
constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here ... does not
foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal").
66. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-31.
67 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 ("[P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in
themselves, but only the means for ensuring 'a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations
of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."' (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825)).
68. The Lewis Court calls this the "actual injury" requirement. Id. at 349. To show a meaningful access
violation, petitioners must demonstrate that the government's conduct or program "hindered [their] efforts to
pursue a legal claim." Id. at 351. As Lewis explained, the petitioner
might show . . . that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical
requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not
have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the
courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a
complaint.
Id
69. The seeds of Bounds arguably were planted three years earlier, in Procunierv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974). There, the Court addressed whether California's prohibition on the use of paralegals or law students
for purposes of interviewing inmates on behalf of the inmate's attorney violated meaningful access. Id. at 41922. The Court invalidated the regulation, explaining that the government cannot "unjustifiably obstruct the
availability of professional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts." Id. at 419
(citation omitted). California's ban undoubtedly impeded access to the courts, and, because California could
not demonstrate the need for such a broad ban, its regulation was unconstitutional. Id.at 420-22. In the
middle of its analysis, however, the Court said an interesting thing: "prison administrators are not required to
adopt every proposal that may be thought to facilitate prisoner access to the courts." Id. at 420 (emphasis
added). Instead, "[t]he
extent to which that right is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be
weighed against the legitimate interests of penal administration and the proper regard that judges should give to
the expertise and discretionary authority of correctional officials." Procunier,416 U.S. at 420. This language
suggests that although the government is not required to adopt every proposal, it is requiredto adopt proposals
that do not unduly undermine the government's legitimate interests. In other words, the access right would not
only remove impediments but would also impose an obligation to adopt reasonable procedures to facilitate
access.
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Smith,70 which held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts
requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law." 71 While this and other language could be interpreted as
dramatically expanding the access right, 72 that reading never really took hold in the
Supreme Court. Following the Bounds decision, the Court steadfastly resisted efforts to
expand it, declining on two occasions to interpret the meaningful access right as
imposing an affirmative obligation to supply postconviction counsel.7 3 And more
recently, in Lewis v. Casey,74 the Court expressly rejected any reading of Bounds that
would impose affirmative obligations on the government to enhance inmates' access to
the courts. As the Court explained, meaningful access does not entitle the prisoner to
assistance that would "enable the prisoner to discover grievances [or] litigate effectively.
once in court." 75 Instead, it requires only that prisoners "be able to present their
grievances to the courts-a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more
limited degree of legal assistance." 76 In short, the access doctrine is not about assisting
the petitioner in developing the best possible petition; instead, it is about (1) removing
govermnent-imposed hurdles that directly interfere with the petitioner's ability to
prepare and properly file the petition, 77 and (2) providing only "the minimal help
79
8
necessary ' 7 to facilitate such access.
While admittedly narrow, the Court's construction of the access right in the
postconviction context comports with the meaningfulness requirement. The purpose of
the right itself-a core consideration in the meaningfulness analysis-is quite narrow.
The right to access was intended to guarantee just that-access. It is about the ability to
get in the courthouse door to "present" known claims to the judge for consideration on
81
the merits. 8 ° In other words, what matters is the opportunity to bring known claims,
not the content of the petition. Removing government-imposed obstacles and requiring
the basic assistance necessary to facilitate preparation and filing are adequate and
effective methods of ensuring access.

70. 430 U.S. 817.
71. Id. at 828 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
72. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
73. Giarratano,492 U.S. at 10-12; Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-57.
74. 518 U.S. 343.
75. Id. at 354 (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
at 360.
77. E.g. id. at 350.
78. Id. at 360.
79. E.g. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360; see generally id at 354--64.
80. Id. at 356 (access right "confer[s] ... a capability-the capability of bringing contemplated challenges
to sentences or conditions of confinement"); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579 (explaining that the access right "assures
that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciaryallegations concerning violations of
fundamental constitutional rights" (emphasis added)); Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485 (explaining that "it is
fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presentingtheir complaints may not be
denied or obstructed" (emphasis added)); Hull, 312 U.S. at 549 (holding that "the state and its officers may not
abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus" (emphasis added)).
81. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414 (describing access right as "litigating opportunity"); see also Lewis,
518 U.S. at 354 (explaining that access claim does not entitle the prisoner to assistance that would "enable the
prisoner to discover grievances" (emphasis omitted)).
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To be sure, procedures designed to enhance the opportunity for success on the
merits, rather than just facilitating access, would greatly assist capital petitioners in their
postconviction pursuits. But such procedures, if required, would transform the right
from simple access to enhanced or perfect access. And the meaningfulness requirement
has never been about perfection. Instead, "adequate" and "effective" are the relevant
watchwords. 82 Finally, and perhaps most importantly in this context, procedures to
optimize, rather than merely facilitate, access would unduly aggravate state sovereignty
interests. Optimization of access would not only be incredibly costly for the states, but it
also would have no practical ending point; every time a better procedure or program
arises, states would be obligated to adopt it. Meaningfulness requires a balance of
competing interests, and if the government has developed and implemented an adequate
system of access, that balance has been achieved.
For these reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that requests for counsel to facilitate
access to the courts have been unsuccessful. 83 Assistance of counsel before the petition
is filed is an important, indeed critical, means of assisting petitioners in discovering and
raising all possible claims. 84 This is no secret. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the
Alabama death-row inmates sought counsel in the Barbourcase. 85 But, again, the access
right does not include the right to "discover grievances [or the right] to litigate
effectively." 86 It is not a vehicle to improve the content of the petition. Thus, the
87
complexity of postconviction proceedings, upon which the Barbour plaintiffs relied,
should be relevant only to the extent that it signals the need for the government to
provide enough basic assistance to allow petitioners the ability to file petitions. 8 8 While
it is true that the presence of counsel makes it easier to file a postconviction petition, the
right of access does not guarantee the easiest manner of access. Instead, it requires
"reasonable" or "adequate" access. 89 If petitioners can file petitions stating their

82. See Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393; Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20; see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at
351 (describing meaningful access as "'a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
fundamental constitutional rights to the courts"' (emphasis added) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825));
McConville, supra n. 1, at 70 (describing meaningfulness requirement).
83. In Finley, for example, the Court relied on the nature of postconviction review, the availability of other
means of presenting claims, and state sovereignty interests in holding that counsel was not constitutionally
required during state postconviction review. 481 U.S. at 555-59; see also Giarratano,492 U.S. at 7-12
(relying on similar considerations to conclude that counsel is not required in capital postconviction
proceedings).
84. See e.g. ABA, Guidelinesfor the Appointment and Performanceof Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 930-31 (2003); McConville, supra n. 1, at 80-84; Texas Defender Service,
Lethal Indifference: The Fatal Combination of Incompetent Attorneys and Unaccountable Courts in Texas
Death Penalty Appeals 2, http://www.texasdefender.org/chapters.pdf (2002).
85. Barbour,410 F. Supp. 2d at 1133; Barbour Br. 26-30.
86. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (emphasis in original); see also Barbour,410 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 ("In short, the
plaintiffs['] demand is the very demand that Lewis foreclosed: a demand that inmates be provided the litigation
capacity to develop claims not contemplated or not known." (footnote omitted)).
87. Barbour,410 F. Supp. 2d at 1133; BarbourBr. 28-32.
88. The Barbour court ruled that "the complexity of the postconviction process and the difficulties of
surmounting it without counsel cannot as a matter of law be equated to a denial of meaningful access."
Barbour,410 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. While this may be true, the complexities of postconviction review should at
least be relevant to the question of access.
89. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (describing access right as "'a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts"' (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825));
Procunier,416 U.S. at 419 (holding that access right "means that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity
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nonfrivolous, known claims 9 0-- as inartful as the petitions might be---then there has been
91
no denial of access.
Although counsel typically will not be required to satisfy the requirements of
meaningful access, one could argue that counsel might be required if a petitioner could
show that the petition "was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement
which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not
have known." 92 As the Lewis Court seemed to recognize, if the access right means
anything, it must mean the ability to properly file the petition. 93 Such an argument,
however, likely will face several obstacles. Take, for example, one of the alleged
injuries suffered by some of the Barbour plaintiffs. As evidence of denial of access,
plaintiffs pointed to numerous pro se petitions that had been dismissed for failure to
comply with Alabama's statute of limitations 94-- a "technical requirement" if ever there
were one. 95 To state a claim for denial of access, however, plaintiffs likely would have
to demonstrate either that information regarding the statute of limitations simply did not
exist either in the prison library or through a prison legal assistance program, or, if the
information did exist in either of these places, that Alabama denied the plaintiffs an
opportunity to discover the information. 96 Moreover, even if Alabama caused the
to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys"); Johnson, 393 U.S. at 490 (holding that the state must provide
"some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief' if the
state insists on "enforc[ing] a regulation ... barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners"
(footnote omitted)).
90. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53.
91. See id at 351 (holding that the petitioner must show that the government's program "hindered his
efforts to pursue a legal claim").
92. Id.
93. The Lewis Court's explanation of how to properly state an access claim is instructive in this regard: if
an inmate is dissatisfied with the prison law library or legal assistance,
the inmate ... must ... demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance
program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint
he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of
deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had
suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by
inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even tofile a complaint.
Id.
(emphasis added).
94. According to the Barbourplaintiffs,
[w]hen this lawsuit was filed in December of 2001, there were thirty-seven death-row prisoners
without legal representation facing imminent filing deadlines. Since the commencement of this
action, of the thirty-seven cases, six have since been dismissed without review because they did not
file in time, [and] another seven are at risk of summary dismissal because the State has asserted that
they did not file in time.
BarbourBr. 37 (footnotes omitted).
95. In 2002, Alabama changed its statute of limitations from two years to one year. Ala. R. Crim. Proc.
32.2(c).
96. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (discussing need to show that the state's system "hindered [petitioner's]
efforts to pursue a legal claim"). In their brief opposing summary judgment, the Barbourplaintiffs challenged
the adequacy of Alabama's library materials, as well as their access to such materials. Specifically, they
argued that the legal materials
consist[ed] of (1) a small collection of volumes in which many reference works indispensable for
the informed pursuit of postconviction litigation are so outdated as to be useless or affirmatively
misleading, or are missing entirely, and (2) an arrangement by which death-row inmates are
permitted to request specific, named books from the larger collection maintained for the non-deathrow prison population but are not even given a list of the books housed in this larger collection, let
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dismissals because it failed to provide either the necessary information or an opportunity
to discover it, the plaintiffs must still convince a court that the assistance of counsel is
the only feasible remedy-a tough (if not impossible) task, given the wide latitude
afforded the states in determining how to solve access problems. 9 7 Finally, plaintiffs
would be entitled to a system-wide remedy (i.e., mandatory appointment of counsel for
all capital inmates before the petitions are due) only if they demonstrate system-wide
injuries. 98 To do this, plaintiffs would have to show that prisoners across Alabama's
death row were denied access to the statute of limitations information and had their
petitions dismissed as a result.
In sum, the likelihood that a right to counsel will ever be part of the access
requirement is extremely remote. Justice Scalia made this painfully clear in Lewis when
he explained why the access right did not include the right to develop claims and "litigate
effectively once in court." 99

In his words, "[t]o demand the conferral of such

sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate
prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we do
not believe the Constitution requires." 100 Thus, any attempt to argue about the quality of
counsel's assistance, the timing of the appointment, or the discretionary nature of the
right must find another outlet. And that outlet is the meaningful right to capital
postconviction counsel.
B.

The Meaningful Right to CapitalPostconvictionCounsel

The government has no constitutional obligation to provide postconviction counsel
to indigent capital inmates. 101 Nevertheless, the vast majority of death penalty
jurisdictions have voluntarily decided to grant statutory rights to counsel, 1 2 and these
decisions, like the decision to provide a postconviction remedy, trigger application of the
meaningfulness requirement. 10 3 Unlike the access strand of the meaningfulness
requirement, however, the capital postconviction counsel strand is very much concerned
with the quality of the case put forth on behalf of the petitioner, precisely because "the
purpose of appointing postconviction counsel in the first place . . . is to protect the

defendant's constitutional rights." 104 To accomplish this, counsel must carefully
navigate the process of postconviction review, which requires not only thorough

alone any means to guess, from a distance, what information might be contained in what books.
Barbour Br. 3 n. 2 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 33 n. 32 (arguing that "Alabama death-row prisoners
(were unable] to access adequate law library materials, books and statutes"). If the plaintiffs' challenge
included specific evidence supporting lack of access to information regarding the statute of limitations, then
they just might have cleared the first of several hurdles in proving the denial of meaningful access.
97. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352-53 (emphasizing the states' flexibility in designing a program for meaningful
access); Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-32 (explaining that "a legal access program need not include any particular
element we have discussed, and we encourage local experimentation").
98. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360.
99. Id.at 354 (emphasis omitted).
100. Id
101. Giarratano,492 U.S. at 10; Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-59.
102. McConville, supra n. 1, at 34-35.
103. Id. at 80-84.
104. Id. at 88.
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knowledge of substantive and procedural law but also investigation of the crime and the
defendant's background, discovery of all possible claims, and timely filing of the petition
in the proper court. 105 Accordingly, in the context of statutorily granted capital
postconviction counsel, the nature and quality of counsel's assistance, as well as the
complexity of the postconviction process, are directly relevant to the meaningfulness
analysis.
To satisfy the meaningfulness requirement, statutory grants of capital
postconviction counsel must include a right to effective assistance of counsel, which
means counsel who actually performs competently, not just counsel who possesses the
capability of doing so. 10 6
But unlike the effectiveness guarantee attached to
constitutional grants of counsel, this guarantee is not enforced through a postperformance review process. Because of the postconviction context and the attendant
concerns for state sovereignty interests, particularly delay and finality, the postconviction
effectiveness guarantee is enforced by (1) ensuring counsel's compliance with rigorous
competency standards and (2) monitoring counsel's performance during the actual
10 7
postconviction proceeding.
The question raised by Alabama's system is whether discretionary grants and
delayed appointments undermine the meaningfulness requirement. This question is
addressed below.
II.

THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF ALABAMA'S GRANT OF
CAPITAL POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL

The State of Alabama provides a discretionary right to capital postconviction
counsel. 108 That is, if the postconviction court believes counsel is necessary to "assert or
protect" an indigent capital petitioner's rights, the court must appoint counsel. 10 9
Alabama, however, does not make the counsel determination until after the petitioner has
filed the petition pro se and survived summary dismissal.' 10 As explained below, both
features of Alabama's counsel system--discretionary grants and delayed
appointment--render its statutory grant of capital postconviction counsel meaningless.

105 Id. at 88-89.
106. Id. at 87-98.
107 McConville, supra n. 28, at 543-98 (discussing the scope and substance of the monitoring
requirement); McConville, supra n. 1, at 104-10 (arguing that monitoring is required to ensure a meaningful
right to capital postconviction counsel).
108. Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a); Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.7(c).
109. Ala. Code § 15-12-23(a); Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.7(c).
110. See Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.7(c) (listing absence of summary dismissal as a condition precedent to
discretionary grant of counsel); Jenkins, 2005 WL 796809 at *5 (describing the process for appointment of
capital postconviction counsel). According to the Barbour plaintiffs, Alabama frequently seeks summary
dismissal:
The Alabama Attorney General's Office routinely files motions to dismiss claims in petitions filed
pro se by death-row prisoners on procedural grounds such as lack of specificity (pursuant to Rule
32.6(b)), to dismiss petitions for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (pursuant
to Rule 32.7(d)), and/or to dismiss claims as procedurally barred (pursuant to Rule 32.2).
Barbour Br. 30. Counsel for plaintiffs-lawyers for EJI--would be in a position to know about the
government's habits in this regard, as EJI lawyers (or lawyers "recruited by EJI, or supported by EJI")
frequently represent Alabama death row inmates on postconviction review. Id. at 4.
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DelayedAppointment

Alabama's delayed appointment system plays a key role in making its right to
The purpose of supplying
counsel nothing more than a "futile gesture."''1
postconviction counsel to capital inmates is to protect their rights. 112 Indeed, Alabama's
statute makes this purpose quite clear: the trial "court shall appoint counsel" if1 13it
determines "that counsel is necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner."
The problem, however, is that Alabama has established a system that makes this goal
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

To protect the rights of capital postconviction petitioners, appointed counsel must
lead petitioners successfully through the complex maze of postconviction procedures,
being sure to preserve all permissible claims. 114 This, in turn, is accomplished in only
one way: by investigating, discovering, and properly raising all permissible claims in the
proper court. 115 This is no easy feat, for as the Texas Defender Service explains:
[t]o present any arguably meritorious claim, the state habeas counsel must perform a
thorough investigation of the case, starting with the written record of the trial, but
exploring far beyond it. The lawyer must contact and interview all important witnesses,
scrutinize the files of all previous defense attorneys, look for issues inadequately
investigated or presented and examine the state's case file for evidence that may have been
withheld from the defense or for indications that state witnesses may have given false or
misleading testimony. The lawyer must investigate and gather all available mitigating
information about the defendant's background, including any history of mental health
problems, brain damage, genetic disorders or physical or sexual abuse. The state habeas
lawyer must uncover any new evidence of violations of the defendant's rights, information
demonstrating that the conviction or sentence was tainted by error of constitutional
magnitude, but was not presented to the jury. 116

111. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397; see Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.
112. See e.g. McConville, supra n. 1, at 85-86 (citing numerous sources supporting idea that the purpose of
counsel is to protect constitutional rights).
113. Ala. R. Cnm. Proc. 32.7(c) (emphasis added).
114. See e.g. McConville, supra n. 1,at 80-82 (describing the role of postconviction counsel); Texas
Defender Service, supra n. 84, at 12-13 (explaining that state "habeas attorney must err on the side of
thoroughness" and raise "every possible legal argument").
115 See e.g. BarbourBr. 28-29; McConville, supra n. 1, at 89; Texas Defender Service, supra n. 84, at 10.
A thorough investigation can lead to the discovery of evidence demonstrating innocence or evidence
supporting a life sentence rather than a death sentence. For example, an investigation might uncover evidence
of an alibi, or it might reveal mitigation evidence that, had trial counsel discovered and raised it during the
penalty phase, would very likely have convinced the jury to vote against capital punishment. In fact, the
Supreme Court recently decided two cases in which postconviction counsel discovered significant mitigation
evidence missed by trial counsel, and in both cases the Court found the evidence sufficient to support a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2003); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). Ineffectiveness claims tend to require investigation for evidence outside the record.
Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some Uncomfortable Reflections on
Massaro v. United States, 42 Brandeis L.J. 793, 795-99 (2004) (discussing Supreme Court's decision in
Massaro v. US., 538 U.S. 500 (2003), and reasons why ineffective assistance claims tend to require evidence
outside the record). However, such investigatory efforts by postconviction counsel are likely to be worth the
time, as a recent study shows that ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been quite successful on state
postconviction review. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995 app. C-3 (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Working Paper Group, June 20,
2000) (available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/liebman-part-1 .html).
116. Texas Defender Service, supra n. 84, at 12.
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By their very nature, counsel's tasks must be accomplished before the petition has
been filed.1 17 So by delaying the appointment determination until after the petition has
been filed and survived summary dismissal, Alabama effectively eliminates counsel's
key responsibilities and places them back in the hands of the petitioner.
Alabama's system might be defensible if capital petitioners were capable of
adequately protecting their own rights in the pre-filing period. But as the Supreme Court
and others have pointed out, capital inmates in general are simply ill-equipped to guide
themselves through this process in a successful manner. 118 As is typical among the
states, 119 Alabama limits its postconviction remedy to claims that (1) could not be raised
at trial or on direct appeal and (2) were not "raised or addressed" at trial or on direct
appeal. 120 Because these are "new" claims in the sense that they have not been raised
and developed in earlier proceedings, capital petitioners do not have the luxury of relying
on briefs or memoranda prepared by counsel at trial or on direct appeal for assistance in
identifying, developing, and articulating their claims.121 Moreover, as a general matter,
evidence supporting these claims exists outside the record, 122 forcing petitioners to
117. See e.g. BarbourBr. 28 (describing work necessary to prepare petition); Texas Defender Service, supra
n. 84, at 12 (same).
118. See e.g. Jenkins, 2005 WL 796809 at *5 (explaining difficulties incarcerated petitioners face in
preparing postconviction petition); McFarland,512 U.S. at 855-56 (explaining that "'[t]he complexity of our
[habeas] jurisprudence ... makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for
collateral relief without the assistance of persons learned in the law' (quoting Giarratano,492 U.S. at 14
(Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring))); BarbourBr. 33 (noting that "an indigent death-row prisoner cannot
uncover the new facts and evidence necessary to sufficiently plead a [postconviction] claim"); Dripps, supra n.
115, at 799 (explaining that postconviction petitioners will have difficulty gathering sufficient evidence to
mount successful ineffective assistance of counsel challenges); Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance
Guaranteesfor Capital State Post-Conviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process
347, 395 (2003) (explaining that capital petitioners are unable to represent themselves because, inter alia, "[n]o
death-row inmate will ever be set free from his prison cell to perform the thorough, independent investigation
of his case that is a fundamental component of competent habeas representation" (internal quotation and
footnote omitted)); Clive A. Stafford Smith & Rfmy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending that Death Row
Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-ConvictionProceedings, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 55, 66-78
(1999) (explaining results of study showing inability of death-row inmates to represent themselves on
postconviction review).
119. Larry W. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies §§ 5, 10 (Laws. Coop. Publg. Co. 1981).
120. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a). The law contains an exception for claims alleging that "[t]he court was
without jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose sentence," id. at 32. 1(b), if such claims "could have been
but [were] not raised at trial" or "on appeal." Id. at 32.2(a)(3), (a)(5).
121. Cf Ross, 417 U.S. at 615 (holding that counsel was not required on discretionary review because courts
can refer to trial record, briefs, and court opinion in determining whether to grant review).
122. Alabama follows the "well-established rule that appellate courts are not permitted to consider matters
outside the record in the particular proceedings under review." Wilson v. State, 830 So. 2d 765, 787-88 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2001) (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also Reynolds v. State, 615 So. 2d 94, 96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)
("'Claims of inadequate representation cannot be determined on direct appeal where such claims were not
raised before the . . . [trial] court and there has been no opportunity to develop and include in the record
evidence bearing on the merits of the allegation."' (quoting Kelley v. State, 568 So. 2d 405, 412 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1990))); Yackle, supra n. 119, at § 1 ("In most jurisdictions there are strict time limits for taking direct
appeals from adverse judgments, appellate courts usually decline to go beyond the record to look for error, and
except in extraordinary circumstances they refuse to consider errors that are of record in the absence of a
contemporaneous objection below."). So if a claim was not (and could not be) raised and developed at trial, or
in a hearing on a motion for a new trial, and it depends upon evidence outside the record, the criminal
defendant must wait to raise it on postconviction, as it will be improper on direct review. See Wilson, 830 U.S.
at 787-88 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also Apicella v. State, 2006 WL 1452927 at **4-5 (Ala. Crim. App. May
26, 2006) (challenge to death sentence was appropriate on postconviction review because it "could not have
been raised at trial or on appeal" because evidence supporting the claim did not exist until several years after
trial and sentencing and was thus outside the record); Brown v. State, 903 So. 2d 159, 164 (Ala. Crim. App.
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investigate, discover, and properly raise all permissible claims on their own. This is
extremely difficult to do, for postconviction petitioners lack the knowledge, training, and
resources necessary to complete these tasks sufficiently. 12 3 As the Alabama Supreme
Court explained:
Because most [postconviction] petitioners are imprisoned, [their] petitions are often based
on a preliminary and restricted investigation of the claims asserted. Furthermore, an
incarcerated inmate who does not have legal counsel is obviously hampered in his or her
ability to interview witnesses, to gather records, to investigate factual questions, and to
12 4
conduct legal research.

Three potential pitfalls await the uncounseled capital postconviction petitioner.
First, the petitioner faces a substantial risk that she will simply fail to discover, and
therefore raise, a relevant claim in the first state petition. This failure has drastic
consequences, for except in very narrow circumstances, claims not raised in the first
petition cannot be raised in a later petition. 125 And because the claim would not be
addressed on the merits in state court, it would be procedurally defaulted on federal
habeas review. 126 Losing the opportunity for review at the federal level is particularly
devastating, as a recent study showed that forty percent of federal habeas petitions are
reversed during federal habeas review.127
Second, even if the petitioner discovers and raises all relevant claims, the petition
will be summarily dismissed unless she can state these claims with "sufficiency" ' 128 and

2004) (claim of ineffective assistance proper on postconviction review when "the trial transcript was not
prepared in time for appellate counsel to have reviewed [it,] ...determined whether any claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel was viable," and included it in the motion for new trial) (citation omitted).
123. See Barbour Br. 38 (explaining that "[i]n
the last few years, at least seven Alabama death-row
prisoners" proceeded pro se and that "fall of these prisoners either have had their cases dismissed or have
been otherwise precluded from state-court review as a result of their inability to obtain adequate legal
assistance" (emphasis in original)).
124. Jenkins, 2005 WL 796809 at *5; see also Barbour Br. 33 (noting that "an indigent death-row prisoner
cannot uncover the new facts and evidence necessary to sufficiently plead a claim under Rule 32" and that "no
pre-filing assistance is offered to death-row prisoners" (footnote omitted)).
125. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(b); see Whitt v. State, 827 So. 2d 869, 876 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)
(postconviction claim filed by pro se capital petitioner properly dismissed as successive because it was not
raised in first petition). Claims of ineffective assistance can never be raised in a successive petition. Ala. R.
Crim. Proc. 32.2(d). To raise a new claim in a successive petition (other than an ineffectiveness claim), the
petitioner must show that
(1)the petitioner is entitled to relief on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to render a
judgment or to impose sentence or (2)... that good cause exists why the new ground or grounds
were not known or could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence when the first
petition was heard, and that failure to entertain the petition will result in a miscarriage of justice.
Id. at 32.2(b). If Alabama does not see fit to provide counsel before the petition is filed, it is unlikely that the
petitioner could cite lack of assistance as "cause" for the failure to uncover the information at an earlier date.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731, 750; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 8081 (1977).
127. Liebman, Fagan & West, supra n. 115, at 6.
128. Under Alabama law, summary dismissal is appropriate whenever "the court determines that the petition
is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists
which would entitle the petitioner to relief." Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.7(d); see also id. at 32.6(b) ("The petition
must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure
of the factual basis of those grounds."). For examples of claims that lack the necessary specificity, see Shaw v.
State, 2006 WL 825142 at *2 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 2006) (petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance
"are merely bare allegations attacking various strategic decisions made by counsel during the course of Shaw's
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in a manner the court will understand. 129 Like failure to raise a claim, summary
dismissal for failure to comply with a state procedural rule will prevent review in both
state and federal court. 13 To withstand dismissal, "[t]he petition must contain a clear
and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full
disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds."
difficult to produce without a full-blown

13 1

But such fulsome allegations will be

investigation-something

postconviction

petitioners cannot do on their own. 132 For example, a petitioner might be aware that her
trial counsel conducted only a cursory mitigation investigation, but because of her
inability to interview witnesses or obtain and review records, she might lack the evidence
to demonstrate what counsel missed. 133 Moreover, if the petitioner is unable to draft a
petition capable of surviving summary dismissal, then the odds are fairly high 13 4 that she

trial and appeal" and thus "fail to meet the specificity requirement of Rule 32.6(b)"); Jenkins, 2005 WL 796809
at *4; Coral v. State, 900 So. 2d 1274, 1280-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (petitioner's ineffective assistance
claims failed to include "specific facts to support the allegation[s]"); Scroggins v. State, 827 So. 2d 878, 88182 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (petitioner failed to adequately support or explain numerous claims). The Barbour
plaintiffs alleged that Alabama "routinely files motions to dismiss claims in petitions filed pro se by death-row
prisoners on procedural grounds such as lack of specificity." BarbourBr. 30.
129. Cf Smith v. State, 479 A.2d 1309, 1312 (Me. 1984) (explaining that assistance of counsel is useful
because "the post-conviction court ... will be in a better position to assure that a worthy claim is not lost
[because of] petitioner's linguistic deficiencies").
130. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731, 750; Sykes, 433 U.S. at 80-81.
131. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.6(b).
132. See Barbour Br. 40 (describing pro se petition dismissed for lack of specificity). If the Barbour
plaintiffs are correct in asserting that the government regularly seeks summary dismissal, see id. at 30-3 1, then
this is a gauntlet most Alabama capital petitioners will likely have to face. One recent capital postconviction
case provides potential insight into the government's tenacious use of motions for summary dismissal, whether
or not the grounds for such dismissal are defensible. In Apicella, 2006 WL 1452927, the government filed no
less than five motions for summary dismissal. The first motion argued that the petition was filed out of time,
but the trial court denied the motion upon finding the petition to be timely. Id. at * I. The second and third
motions for summary dismissal related to petitioner's amended petition, raising procedural bar (second motion)
and insufficient pleading (third motion) arguments. Id The government did, however, "indicate[] [that] it
would not oppose if the trial court granted [petitioner] 30 days to amend the claims that were not sufficiently
pleaded." Id. The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's ineffective assistance claims
(which the government alleged were insufficient), but, before the scheduled hearing, the state subsequently
withdrew motions two and three and filed a fourth motion for summary dismissal, this time only on grounds of
insufficiency. Id. The petitioner then filed a second amended petition, prompting the government to file a
fifth, and final, motion for summary dismissal. Apicella, 2006 WL 1452927 at *2. The trial court granted the
fifth motion before the scheduled evidentiary hearing, which of course never went forward. Id. The
government's fortunes changed on appeal, however, when the appellate court reversed the trial court's
summary dismissal with respect to a claim the trial court ruled was procedurally barred because it should have
been raised during trial. Id. at *5. As the appellate court explained, the evidence supporting the claim came
into existence after the trial, making it impossible to raise on either trial or appeal and thus appropriate for
postconviction review. Id. at *4. If Apicella is representative of Alabama's attitude toward postconviction
petitions, pro se petitioners will be buried in summary dismissal motions. And while Mr. Apicella was on the
winning side of the summary dismissal war in his case, given the general difficulty with discovering and
supporting permissible postconviction claims, it is unlikely that many other petitioners will meet with similar
success.
133. See Dripps, supra n. 115, at 799 (explaining that postconviction petitioners will have difficulty
"attempting to prepare to develop the kind of record" necessary to mount a successful ineffectiveness
challenge); cf Texas Defender Service, supra n. 84, at 16-17 ("[l]f the claimed error was that the trial counsel
failed to investigate a particular issue, the habeas lawyer must provide the court with specific factual
information that could have been located by the trial lawyer and probably would have changed the outcome of
the trial." (fottnote omitted)).
134. This is not to say that it is impossible. See Apicella, 2006 WL 1452927 at *5 (reversing summary
dismissal with respect to one claim); Scroggins, 827 So. 2d at 880-81 (reversing summary dismissal with
respect to several claims).
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will be unable to marshal sufficient facts and arguments to persuade the court that it
And it does not help matters that the
incorrectly dismissed the petition. 135
where possible," 136 as
postconviction petition will "be assigned to the sentencing judge
137
claims.
petitioner's
the
to
that judge might not be very receptive
Third, the petitioner must prepare and file a complete petition as quickly as
possible. Alabama imposes a stringent one-year limitations period, and failure to file
within that time period results in summary dismissal 138 (which in turn results in
forfeiture of all claims in the petition). 139

But as the Barbour plaintiffs emphasized,

petitioners must file their state petitions well in advance of the one-year deadline in order
to preserve time to prepare and file a federal habeas petition within the federal
40
limitations period. 1

The foregoing critique of delayed appointments finds strong support in the
Supreme Court's decision in McFarland v. Scott, 14 1 a statutory interpretation case
addressing the proper timing for the appointment of federal habeas counsel. By statute,
indigent capital inmates who wish to seek federal habeas review possess a mandatory
right to counsel.

14 2

The statute failed to specify, however, whether the right attached

135. It does not appear that Alabama appoints counsel to appeal the grant of summary dismissal. See Ala. R.
Crim. Proc. 32.7(c) (Counsel can be appointed "[i]f the court does not summarily dismiss the petition.").
136. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.6(d).
137. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River without a Procedure:Innocent Prisonersand Newly Discovered
Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 659-60 (2005) (arguing that having the original trial
court determine claims for postconviction relief might be problematic because the judge "may have a vested
interest in the outcome, and that judge's decision normally receives tremendous deference on appeal"
(footnotes omitted)); but see Dripps, supra n. 115, at 796 (suggesting that it would be beneficial to have
original trial judge evaluate ineffectiveness challenges raised on postconviction review). In Alabama, the
sentencing judge can impose the death penalty even if the jury recommends a sentence of less than death. Ala.
Code § 13A-5-47(e) (Lexis 2005) ("While the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given
consideration, it is not binding upon the court."). In these instances in particular, the sentencing judge might be
less than sympathetic to the petitioner's claims.
138. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(c). Alabama's one-year limitations period begins to run upon "the issuance of
the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals ... or ... in the case of a conviction not appealed
to the Court of Criminal Appeals ... [once] the time for filing an appeal lapses." Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(c).
The Barbour plaintiffs provided examples demonstrating the government's desire to enforce the statute of
limitations. Barbour Br. 35-37. They also indicated that, at the time they filed their brief opposing summary
judgment, numerous capital petitioners were at risk for missing the filing deadline. Id. at 9 ("At the latest
count, seven indigent death-row inmates have statutes of limitations running and no lawyers to assist them to
meet the limitations deadlines by filing Rule 32 petitions that will state a claim sufficient to begin the state and
federal post-appeal process." (footnote and citation omitted)).
139. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
140. BarbourBr. 5-6, 41. The one-year federal limitations period begins to run once the "judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review," 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(l)(A), which means when the Supreme Court's review on certiorari,or the time for seeking such
review, has ended. Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998). The federal period is tolled upon the
proper filing of a state postconviction petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). State petitioners, therefore, must file
as soon as possible in order to preserve time to prepare and file the federal petition. But as the Barbour
plaintiffs explained:
[Because of] the state's failure to provide legal assistance, many death row prisoners have spent
most of the [one-year federal limitations period] trying to find counsel. Consequently, many have
filed shell petitions or pleadings prepared by law students or staff at EJI at the last minute, leaving
inadequate time to pursue federal postconviction review when the state court process is completed.
BarbourBr. 41 (citation omitted).
141. 512 U.S. 849.
142. At the time McFarlandwas decided, the mandatory counsel provision for capital habeas petitioners was
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before or after filing the petition. 143 Relying on the complexity of federal habeas
doctrine, as well as its own doubt regarding the ability of capital petitioners to prepare a
petition on their own, the Court interpreted the statute to allow such petitioners to seek
counsel before filing their postconviction petitions. 144 Of particular concern was the risk
that a petitioner's "habeas claims never would be heard on the merits" if she had to
"proceed without counsel in order to obtain counsel." 14 5 Congress, the Court reasoned,
146
"did not intend for the express requirement of counsel to be defeated in this manner."
Justice O'Connor spoke even more plainly in her concurring opinion: "[i]t is almost
claims on federal habeas if the lawyer is not
meaningless to provide a lawyer to pursue
14 7
available to help prepare the petition."'
Although McFarlandwas a statutory interpretation case, its analysis is instructive,
whether
the issue is one of statutory interpretation or due process, the underlying
for
question is meaningfulness--the reasonable achievement of the statute's purpose. Thus,
if delayed appointment would undermine Congress' grant of counsel, then delayed
appointment must also undermine Alabama's grant of counsel.
One might argue that delayed appointment is not always disastrous for petitioners,
and in those circumstances at least, delayed appointment does not violate the
meaningfulness requirement. It is possible, for example, that an inmate's petition will
survive summary dismissal and that counsel will be appointed to assist the petitioner on a
going forward basis. No harm, no foul. But this argument fails for several reasons.
First, petitioners who survive summary dismissal will not automatically receive courtappointed counsel because, as mentioned above, the right to counsel is discretionary.
Second, even if the court appoints counsel, counsel's efforts to represent the petitioner
will be severely crippled. After the petition has been filed, there will be much less time
to conduct the all-important investigation--reviewing the record, analyzing evidence,
interviewing witnesses, and evaluating the performance of trial and appellate counsel.
Instead of trying to cull the landscape for all possible claims-4he primary job of any
postconviction counsel--counsel will be forced to focus myopically on developing and
presenting the existing claims, preparing for a potential evidentiary hearing, and
responding to motions and briefs filed by the government. Third, even if counsel is
somehow able to discover additional claims, these claims will not be considered on the
merits unless the court allows the petitioner to amend the petition. This can be difficult

codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). 512 U.S. at 854. The mandatory counsel provision for such petitioners is
now codified at Pub. L. No. 109-177, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), 120 Stat. 231 (2006).
143. McFarland,512 U.S. at 854.
144. As the Court explained:
An attorney's assistance prior to the filing of a capital defendant's habeas corpus petition is crucial,
because "[t]he complexity of our jurisprudence in this area ... makes it unlikely that capital
defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assistance of
persons learned in the law."
Id.at855-56 (quoting Giarratano,492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring)).
145. Id.at 856.
146. Id.
147. Id at 860 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Like the majority, Justice O'Connor
expressed concern that uncounseled petitioners would be unable to support their claims adequately and would
risk summary dismissal if the petitions "appear on their face to be meritless." McFarland,512 U.S. at 860.
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to do in Alabama even though under Alabama law amendments are permissible "at any
stage of the proceedings prior to the entry of judgment"' 148 and "[l]eave to amend shall
be freely granted." 14 9 Postconviction courts in Alabama retain discretion to deny
motions to amend if "the petitioner has unduly delayed filing the amendment or [if] an
amendment [would] unduly prejudice[] the State." 150 Although it is unlikely that a court
would find undue delay on the petitioner's part given that she recently received counsel,
it is quite possible that the court would find undue prejudice to the state. Indeed, in
Jenkins, the Alabama Supreme Court explained that a court would be justified in denying
a motion to amend if "on the eve of an evidentiary hearing, a Rule 32 petitioner filed an
amendment that included new claims of which the State had no prior notice and as to
which it was not prepared to defend."'15 1 This means that newly appointed counsel must
find and raise all new claims as quickly as possible or face a real risk that the court will
not permit an amendment. In short, counsel cannot reasonably be expected to complete
pre- and post-filing work during the very same time period. Cramming work into the
post-filing time period unnecessarily hampers the quality of counsel's performance, thus
52
undermining the delivery of effective assistance. 1
In sum, if the point of providing capital postconviction counsel is to protect the
rights of postconviction petitioners--and by Alabama's own admission, this assuredly is
the point-Alabama's system fails miserably. Delaying appointment removes counsel

148. Ala. R. Crim. Proc. 32.7(b).
149. Id. at 32.7(d). If the trial court's rulings in Wilson v. State, 911 So. 2d 40 (Ala. Crim App, 2005), are
any indication of how trial courts handle amendment motions, then petitioners will face an uphill battle when
seeking to amend their petitions--at least when they are before the trial court. In Wilson, the trial court denied
all five motions to amend filed by counsel on behalf of a capital petitioner even though all of the motions were
filed before the two-year limitations period expired. Id. at 44-45. Moreover, three of the five amendment
motions contained allegations designed to respond to the government's answer and an affidavit by petitioner's
lead trial counsel, which the government filed to support its answer in connection with petitioner's claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 45-46. Thankfully for the petitioner, the court of appeals came to the
rescue; it reversed, ruling that the amendments did not prejudice the government and were not designed to
delay the proceedings. Id. The court also explained that, by denying the amendments responding to the
government's answer and affidavit, the trial court made it impossible for the petitioner to respond to the
evidence introduced by the government. Id. at 46.
150. Jenkins, 2005 WL 769806 at *5.
151. Id.
152. One might also argue that, even if the meaningfulness requirement requires appointment before the
petition is filed, a petitioner cannot state a violation unless and until she shows that Alabama's failure to
provide counsel in the pre-filing period caused "actual injury" in the form of a lost claim--just as petitioners
must do in mounting a meaningful access claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-51. But such a claim is meritless.
With meaningful access, there is no violation unless and until petitioner is unable to get to court with a known
claim. Id. at 351 ("'[M]eaningful access to the courts is the touchstone,' and the inmate therefore must go one
step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim." (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823)). The lost claim, therefore, demonstrates
the lack of meaningful access. See id. With meaningful counsel, on the other hand, a violation occurs
whenever the government interferes with the delivery of effective assistance, whether or not the interference
results in a lost claim. This is because the right to meaningful capital postconviction counsel is just as much
about the ability to find claims as it is about actually raising those claims. Thus, if the government voluntarily
sets up a counsel system that hinders a petitioner's ability to discover claims-as is the case with Alabama's
delayed appointment system--then the counsel system is meaningless. Moreover, it hardly makes sense to
require a petitioner to produce the very evidence---i.e., the lost claim--that counsel is appointed to uncover in
order to state a violation of the right to meaningful capital postconviction counsel. As explained above,
because they are in prison, capital petitioners are simply unable to conduct the investigation necessary to fully
develop their postconviction petitions. See supra nn. 118, 124 and accompanying text. If they were required to
produce such evidence, then few, if any, meaningful counsel claims could ever go forward.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2006

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 42 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 4

TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:253

from the most critical part of postconviction review, effectively preventing the
performance of tasks necessary to protect the petitioner's rights. As a result, capital
petitioners are forced to fend for themselves during the pre-filing period, just as they
would have to if Alabama had never seen fit to provide a right to counsel in the first
place. Without question, Alabama's delayed appointment system renders its grant of
counsel unconstitutional.
B.

DiscretionaryGrantsof Counsel

Having demonstrated the problems with delayed appointment, there remains only
one loose end--the discretionary nature of Alabama's grant of counsel. Under
Alabama's current system, even if a petitioner survives summary dismissal, she is not
guaranteed appointment of counsel. Instead, counsel will be appointed only if the trial
court, in its discretion, determines that "counsel is necessary to assert or protect the
' 153
rights of the petitioner.
As a threshold matter, one might argue that the discretionary nature of the right to
counsel postpones application of the meaningfulness analysis until after counsel is
appointed. In other words, if the meaningfulness requirement is triggered once a right is
granted, then, in the case of a discretionary right, it is triggered only when the court
actually exercises its discretion to grant counsel. Before that point, the argument goes,
the petitioner has no right to counsel. 154 This argument fails, however, for it improperly
focuses on the court's exercise of discretion rather than on the legislature's decision to
provide counsel on a discretionary basis. Once the government decides to provide
counsel, due process requires an evaluation of all terms under which that right is granted
to ensure that the grant provides effective assistance of counsel. 155 The discretionary
nature of the right, no less than the delayed appointment, is a term that must be evaluated
to determine whether Alabama's right to counsel is meaningful. Thus, it is the
legislature's decision to provide a discretionary right to counsel, not the exercise of
discretion in an individual case, that triggers the meaningfulness requirement.
Not surprisingly, the news is not good for Alabama. As mentioned above,
Alabama postconviction courts may appoint counsel if necessary to "assert or protect"

153. Ala. R. Crim Proc. 32.7(c). Discretionary rights to postconviction counsel are not unusual in noncapital cases. The federal government and numerous states provide discretionary rights on postconviction
review. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (2000) (discretionary right to counsel in federal habeas cases
challenging state or federal convictions); Andrew Hammel, DiabolicalFederalism:A Functional Critique and
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 83-99 (2002)
(compilation of counsel provisions for non-capital and capital postconviction proceedings in all fifty states
reveals thirty-four states with discretionary right to postconviction counsel in non-capital cases). As explained
earlier, supra n. 34, this article does not address the constitutionality of discretionary grants of postconviction
counsel in non-capital cases. Because of the extreme and final nature of capital punishment, this article focuses
only on the constitutionality of discretionary rights to counsel in the capital postconviction context.
154. Under this argument, only petitioners who actually receive court-appointed counsel have a right to
meaningful counsel. The problems with delayed appointment would still apply, requiring that the appointment,
if it is to take place, must take place before the petition must be filed.
155. See McConville, supra n. 1,at 97 (arguing "[t]he government cannot limit its obligation [under the
meaningfulness requirement] by declaring that its right to counsel contains an effectiveness component
measured in pre-performance terms").
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the petitioner's rights. 156 Presumably, this means that appointment would be appropriate
only in situations where there are rights to protect. The process would be straightforward
if the petitioner knows of, and can fully articulate, all alleged violations of her rights.
Absent that, however, the court will be hard-pressed to make an accurate determination
of whether a given petitioner has any rights to protect.
In addition, Alabama limits its postconviction remedy to claims that were not and
could not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, 157 which generally means claims
that are supported by evidence outside the record. 158 Thus, to determine whether a
petitioner needs the assistance of counsel, the court would have to examine evidence that
is not contained within the existing record. But unless the judge conducts an
investigation-which, of course, would require her to shed the role of neutral decision
maker and assume the role of advocate1 59-she will not have all the information relevant
to an accurate determination of the petitioner's need for counsel. Accordingly, in most
(if not all) instances, Alabama postconviction courts will have no real information upon
which to base their appointment decisions. This creates an intolerable risk that the courts
will fail to appoint counsel in cases where petitioners in fact have rights to protect, which
in turn renders the right to counsel meaningless. Discretionary appointments might make
sense in the context of discretionary direct review, where the court can review the record
for possible error, 16 but they do not make sense in the context of postconviction review,
where the court depends on the existence of evidence outside the record to evaluate the
possibility of error.
A discretionary grant of counsel is also problematic because it appears to assume
that capital inmates are differently situated in their ability to protect their rights on
postconviction review. But as explained above, this assumption is false. In terms of
their ability to protect their rights by investigating, discovering, and properly raising all
permissible claims, all capital inmates are similarly situated: they are unable to do so. As
156. Ala. R. Crim Proc. 32.7(c).
157. Id.at 32.2(a).
158. See supra n. 122 and accompanying text. It is theoretically possible that a postconviction claim could
depend upon, and be resolved by, evidence entirely within the record. This might happen, for example, when
the trial transcript is not prepared in time for appellate counsel to review it for any record claims before the
expiration of time for filing a motion for a new trial. Cf Brown, 903 So. 2d at 164 (transcript of guilty plea
unavailable before time for filing motion for new trial expired, so ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim
could not have been raised in motion for new trial or on appeal and thus was proper on postconviction). In this
situation, the postconviction court could evaluate the need for counsel by examining the record. But whether
the courts actually conduct such a review, or instead rely on the pro se petitioner's description of the alleged
errors, is unknown. If it is the latter, then the postconviction courts are very likely making the appointment
determination without sufficient information.
159. See e.g. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (explaining that judges "have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants" and that "[riequiring district courts to advise a pro se litigant [of habeas
procedure and strategy] would undermine district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers"); Randall L.
Hodgkinson, No-Merit Briefs Undermine the Adversary Process in Criminal Appeals, 3 J. App. Prac. &
Process 55, 56-57 (2001) (noting difference between judge's role and advocate's role); Barbara R. Levine,
Preventing Defense Counsel Error-AnAnalysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and Their
Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. Toledo L. Rev. 1275, 1433 (1984) (noting that trial judges
must be careful to stay neutral when monitoring trial counsel's performance).
160. See Ross, 417 U.S. at 615 (holding that counsel is not constitutionally required for discretionary appeals
during direct review because, inter alia, the courts can examine the existing record to determine whether to
grant review); cf Hammel, supra n. 118, at 395 (arguing that inmates would have an easier time representing
themselves during direct review than during postconviction review).
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Andrew Hammel so vividly explained: "[n]o death-row inmate will ever be set free from
his prison cell to perform the thorough, independent investigation of his case that is a
fundamental component of competent habeas representation."' 16 1 It is thus no wonder
that thirty-two death penalty states and the federal government have seen fit to provide a
mandatory right to capital postconviction counsel, while only four states have decided to
provide a discretionary right. 162 It is also no wonder that the ABA's Guidelinesfor the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
call for
63
mandatory appointment of competent counsel during postconviction review. 1
In short, it simply is not possible for a court to rationally and reasonably
differentiate among capital postconviction petitioners on the basis of need. All will
struggle to discover and present their claims in a sufficient manner, and all will need
counsel to assist them.
III.

CONCLUSION

Like all other jurisdictions that voluntarily provide a right to capital postconviction
counsel, Alabama has a constitutional obligation to ensure that the right is meaningful.
Unfortunately, Alabama has not lived up to its responsibilities in this regard. Its promise
to consider appointing counsel after the petition has already been filed is nothing more
than a "futile gesture."' 164 As Alabama law proclaims, the purpose of appointing counsel
is to assist petitioners in protecting their rights. This can only be accomplished by
ensuring that petitioners discover and raise all permissible claims at the proper time and
in the proper court. By necessity, counsel's work must begin well in advance of any
filing deadline. Thus, by delaying the appointment decision until after the petition has
been filed, Alabama effectively prevents counsel from performing the most important
aspects of the job, which undermines the effectiveness guarantee and, hence, the
meaningfulness requirement.
The discretionary nature of the right fares no better. A postconviction court
cannot be expected to accurately assess the need for counsel in an individual case
because it lacks access to information necessary to make that determination--evidence
outside the record that supports allegations of error. Unless the petitioner is in
possession of such evidence, which is highly doubtful, the court will make the
appointment determination without all relevant evidence. This creates an unacceptable
risk that petitioners who have rights to protect-and who are thus entitled to counsel
under state law-will not receive counsel. The consequences are drastic and irrevocable
in all cases, but especially in those involving petitioners who are innocent. In the end,
Alabama's system offers nothing more than an empty promise. And under the
meaningfulness requirement, this simply is not enough.

161. Hammel, supra n. 118, at 395 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
162. See McConville, supra n. 1; see also Dripps, supra n. 115, at 799 (prisoners' inability to investigate and
develop their claims explains "why, at least in capital cases, counsel typically appears as a matter of court
appointment or local rule to represent prisoners in the first round of state collateral attack proceedings.").
163. ABA, supra n. 84, at 930-31.
164. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397; see Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.
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